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The topic of language evolution is characterised by the scarcity of records, but also by a large 
flow of research produced within multiple subtopics and perspectives. Over the past few 
decades, significant advancement has been made on the geographical and temporal origins of 
language, while current work is rather devoted to the underpinnings of language, in brain, genes, 
body, and culture of humans. Much of this literature is polarized over the crucial dichotomy of 
nativism versus emergentism. Our state of affairs report also confirms a high degree of 
speculation, albeit with a decrease for modelling. To tackle the speculation and the large 
research flow, we propose a more impersonal kind of review, focused on the topic’s questions 
rather than on particular accounts. Another observation is that novel perspectives are on the 
rise. One of these highlights the importance of perceptual cognition, often dubbed 
‘embodiment,’ in the earlier evolution of language. In following this lead, we adapted a 
previous experiment which had investigated the correspondence between certain perceptual 
features of events, and different grammatical orders arising as participants acted out those 
events. That design made a perfect basis for us to put in an additional variable, namely the 
contrast between body-based communication (gestures), and more disembodied 
communication (symbol matching). Albeit tentative, the results of this pilot experiment reveal 
a greater effect of the embodiment variable on the grammatical preferences, which we see as 








1  Introduction 
 
Evolutionary linguistics encompasses the origins of language, the change within and across 
different languages, and the acquisition of language and languages by children and adults 
(Gong, Shuai, & Zhang, 2014). Arguably, the origins are the ultimate, most crucial question in 
this triad, to the extent that the origins determine the evolution and the acquisition in turn. For 
that reason, greater attention will be paid the origins in this paper. We shall start framing this 
voyage by looking back two centuries. In the mid-19th, many of the theories on language origins 
seem to have displayed considerable ‘imagination’ (Aitchison, 2008: 17; see for instance 
Grimm 1851/1905, in German), which did stir some scepticism on this study (Whitney, 1873). 
Indeed, by 1866 the question had become so blurred in the eyes of the Societé Linguistique de 
Paris (a French authority in linguistic research at the time) that they decided to protect the topic 
by banning it altogether.1 The sequence of events around the great ban is ceaselessly recounted 
(Deacon, 1998; Christiansen & Kirby, 2003b; Tallerman & Gibson, 2012), but it usually stops 
at that. In trying to probe further, we will next consider an extract on language evolution from 
the time: 
 
The further argument for the possession of language by mammals and birds, at least, is that they 
readily learn to respond to a name given them. To what extent that sense can be cultivated is 
shown in Sir John Lubbock’s dog, which brings out a card with "o-u-t" on it when he wants to 
take a walk. (Jastrow, 1886: 556) 
 
Published in Science two decades into the French ban, Jastrow’s account betrays lacunas in 
general cognition as well as on language proper. First, a basic symbol-stimulus connection on 
the part of the dog is interpreted as language use, no less. That reveals the under-definition of 
language. Another important lacuna is that of direct evidence: early language had left no trace 
for scholars to analyse (only long after the appearance of language did writing develop). As a 
general result, the accounts of the mid-19th century could not be judged against any preeminent 
theory, which may have allowed for the more facile explanations. Certainly, speculation was a 
major factor in the mid-19th century crisis (Deacon, 1998). Yet, arguably, it has also been an 
integral part of science for a long time, even if we have grown more factual of late. It might 
                                                          
1Articles from before the ban are highly elusive online. As regards censorship around science, notice current 
examples in areas such as evolution (against creationism, see Press Association, 2014), and environment (against 
the denial of global-warming, see Pnewell, 2008). 
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simply be problematic in great quantity, so how much is there at present? According to some 
scientists, speculation in the area of language evolution is still abundant: 
 
—  In this admittedly speculative essay... (Deacon, 2003: 138) 
—  Theory and speculation are simply not empirically comparable. 
(Smolensky & Dupoux, 2009: 468) 
—  The absence of direct evidence does not, of course, prevent speculation, hypothesizing and 
inferencing, and in the ever-growing literature on language evolution we see all. 
(Pavlenko, 2014: 26) 
 
We will aim at a more quantitative measure by comparing the speculation in the LE area with 
that in others, on the basis of a repository survey. As such, we calculated a rough measure of 
the acknowledgment about speculation in several areas, as reflected in publications from 1994 
to 2014. Specifically, the ‘speculation ratios’ in Table 1 were obtained by dividing the number 
of hits with the term ‘speculation’ by the total hits, i.e. with and without the term. 
 
 
Table 1. Speculation ratios ordered from the highest rank, LE, through other areas of language 
research, down to a topic from the so-called exact sciences.2 
 
According to this index search, LE ranks high in the contingency of speculation. Because this 
is a relatively novel, perhaps even unorthodox, method of analysis, we decided to include a 
topic from the hardcore sciences among our queries—the (Large) Hadron Collider, a recent 
advancement in physics—, and as predicted it came out with the lowest ratio of speculation. 
Also importantly, alternative forms of the term ‘speculation’ were used, such as ‘speculating’ 
and ‘speculative,’ on which LE did not shift its rank. The figures stand to reason, considering 
the lacunas on LE described above. The same holds for the current lacks in subfields relevant 
                                                          
2Every term in each entry is present in every hit (e.g., +language +evolution +speculation). Time range: 1994-
2014. All other parameters as default. Conducted 20th September, 2014 on the Thomson Reuters’ Web of ScienceTM 
(http://wokinfo.com/). Institutional hosting is required.  
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to LE, such as genetics and neuroscience (Marcus, Marblestone & Freeman, 2014). It is in such 
a context that Hauser et al. (2014) questioned the feasibility of the LE enterprise. In fact they 
concluded with a rather pessimistic forecast, which they would revise only after crucial 
knowledge has been attained in the areas that inform LE research (similarly, see Wu, 2014). 
Moreover, the great acceleration of data coming from various disciplines makes it hard to attain 
any desirable synthesis: in other words, it is hard to draw general conclusions from the stream 
of individual findings (Fitch, 2014). Yet, for a more optimistic state of affairs, we could 
highlight the greater scientific rigour that was attained after the ban—to start by thinking of the 
pioneers, Chomsky (1968), or Pinker and Bloom (1990). What is more , this positive trend has 
extended to date, as evident from a wealth of current studies ranging from linguistic features 
(Evans & Levinson, 2009) to language genes (Fisher & Scharff, 2009) through evolutionary 
correlates (Tomasello, Call, & Gluckman, 1997). Achieving a more conclusive ‘checkup’ 
constitutes one major goal for this paper, and with that aim we will review much of the research 
produced after the ban. We will tackle the more secured bases as well as the harder question of 
what language is indeed.  
 
 
2  Coordinates traced 
 
In spite of historical lacunas, substantial findings have been made with regard to the spatial 
coordinates of language origins. Most of the evidence from archaeology, historical demography 
and computational modelling has rendered wide acceptance of the monogenesis of languages 
from Africa (Tallerman & Gibson, 2012; Levinson & Holler, 2014), contra earlier theories such 
as polygenesis (Nichols, 2011) and macromutation (Chomsky, 1968). As for the time of origin, 
estimates range from 2.6M years ago (Semaw, 2000; Stutz, 2014), through 1.4M (Levinson & 
Holler, 2014), on to about 70k years (Bolhuis, Tattersall, Chomsky, & Berwick, 2014; 
Chomsky, 2011). First off, we should not bypass the marvel behind these estimations: their 
mere existence tells of ever more precise tools, both archaeological and analytical-
computational. Still, the divergences as for time are too large: are these scholars even thinking 
of Language in the same way? Likely not. To illustrate, if the language one has in mind is 
fundamentally linked to the processing of syntactic units in communication (Bolhuis et al., 
2014), the date of origin will be set much more recent than if we think of language as more 
importantly linked to broader factors not specific to language, to know, social structuration, 
mass migrations, or cultural production (Stutz, 2014). In the long run, therefore, it remains a 
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necessity to address the core nature of language. However, that is the hardest nut to crack. In 
sum, under-defined language, and the lack of direct evidence that is inherent to LE have left us 
to search for the fundamental support(s) of language in its origin, evolution and acquisition. In 
words of Hurford (2003: 40), we are left ‘with the material (anatomical, neural, biochemical) 
bases of language in humans, related phenomena in less evolved creatures, and the dynamics 
of populations and cultural transmission.’  
 
 
3  Underpinnings of language 
 
3.1  In the mind 
 
The mind, as a constructed proxy for brain, has been understandably more accessible in LE 
research. The majority of accounts fall over two ballparks: language-specific or not. 
 
 
3.1.1  A language-specific system  
 
In the late 1960s, Chomsky (1968) touched upon LE as he posited an innate language faculty 
for humans. Thus, hardwired on the human brain through the ‘Universal Grammar’ (UG), 
language would be supported by a ‘Language Acquisition Device’—a correlate of the non-
generativist ‘critical period’ (Hurford, 1989). Chomsky’s early-cognitive theory appeared in the 
midst of reigning formalism, which surely must have contributed to its broad impact in and out 
of the linguistic field. It is also relevant to remark, yet, that Chomsky seldom addresses the 
origins or evolution of language; he regards those as irrelevant because the language faculty 
would have mutated, rather than evolved. 
 
The cognitive era in LE started to set in with the 1975 conference on ‘Origins and Evolution of 
Language and Speech’—the first major LE meeting after 200 years—according to Harnad, 
Steklis, and Lancaster (1976). The authors also report a sizeable representation of accounts in 
within the conference. The sections included ‘history of language-origins theory; formulating 
the target; protolanguages and universals: perceptual and cognitive substrates; artificial 
intelligence; paleobiological approaches; the fossil record and neural organization; behavioral 
parallels and continuities; gestural origin theories; linguistic competence of apes; perception 
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and production of speech; neural parallels and continuities; and language and the human brain’. 
It might surprise the reader to see gestural origin theories listed there, as one may have the 
feeling at present that this is cutting-edge (e.g., Tomasello, 2008). Fifteen years later, another 
landmark was set with a target article by Pinker and Bloom (1990).3 The authors coincided with 
Chomsky’s 1968 stand on the evolutionary discontinuity, as they too posited a fundamental gap 
between the communicative system of modern humans and that of our closest ancestors (Pinker, 
1994; see also Jackendoff, 2002).4 But aside from support, Chomsky’s UG has attracted much 
dissent, especially with regard to its emergence. Contra Chomsky’s proposal of 
‘macromutation,’ Pinker has posited natural selection, famously likening the evolution of UG 
to that of vision (Pinker, 1994; in turn against that, see Sampson, 2005). Also, contrary to 
Chomsky’s UG for internal thought (Fitch, Hauser & Chomsky, 2005), Pinker’s ‘language 
instinct’ is rather an adaptation for communication (Jackendoff & Pinker, 2005). 
 
 
3.1.2  A general cognitive system 
 
Some scholars see no need for innate, language-dedicated devices. Indeed, the emergentist 
approach (also dubbed empiricist or functionalist) points to general cognitive structures in the 
modern human brain as the fundamental support for language (Enfield, 2013). General 
cognitive systems of two types have emerged within this paradigm: 
 
Complex-structure cognition. This account underscores the importance of cognitive 
developments for LE (as accompanied by a sheer increase in brain size). In this vein, 
Christiansen and Kirby (2003b) remark on the ability to process complex linguistic relations 
and hierarchies as a prime essential of the language capacity. Comparable accounts have looked 
at complex thought more generally (Richardson, 2007; Evans and Levinson, 2009), now 
labelled as ‘supra-regular computation’ (Bickel, 2014), now as ‘a propensity by our species to 
infer tree structures from sequential data’ (Fitch, 2014: 329). According to Vogt (2006a: 177), 
language would thus be ‘a complex communication system that is—among other things—
                                                          
3The paper that is available online unfortunately lacks the peer commentary. Yet, the full version can be ordered 
from the Harvard repository. 
4To date, most construals of innate specialized devices seem to have been replaced by theories with holistic, 
learning-based devices (cf. Kant’s ‘a priori’ systems; Friedman, 1994; Palmquist, 1987).  
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symbolic, learnt, compositional and recursive, whereas all other species’ communication 
systems typically lack these properties.’ 
 
Complex social cognition. What really made a difference for LE may have been high-level 
social cognition. Tomasello (2009)—’Universal Grammar is Dead’—argues that any and all 
so-claimed linguistic universals are the result of more general biases in human thought. For 
instance, semantic roles across languages would be explained by the natural tendency of 
humans to think in categories. Tomasello (2008) also underlines ‘shared intentionality’ and 
‘joint attention’ as fundamental in the acquisition of cultural forms, e.g. language. This is 
supported by the great chasm spanning from primate selfishness to human collaboration. 
Indeed, Rivas (2005) observed that, as primates address humans by signs, their communicative 
intentions were 98% requests. On the phylogeny of language, Tomasello (2008: 320) concludes 
that ‘the road to human cooperative communication begins with great ape intentional 
communication’—though he refines, ‘especially as manifest in gestures,’ acknowledging a 
modality break in the continuum. In a similar vein, but focused on the ontogeny of language 
(i.e. in the child), Vogt and Lieven (2010) have argued that language emergence in evolution 
could be parallel to first language acquisition, both advancing through a continuum (see also 
Chater & Christiansen, 2010). 
 
 
3.2  In the genes 
 
Fisher et al.’s (1998) report on the relationship between an inherited language impairment and 
the mutation of a gene was hailed by nativists as the discovery of the ‘language gene’ (Pinker 
& Jackendoff, 2005; but see also Vernes et al., 2008). However, the emergence of that protein, 
the FoxP2, has been dated back to evolutionary stages prior to language (Krause et al., 2007). 
For this reason, nativist takes on the FoxP2 have met criticism for the sidestepping of genetic 
conditions such as ‘disfunctionality,’ ‘nonuniqueness’ and ‘functionlessness’ (Botha, 2002; see 
also Sampson, 2005). Also, the human exclusivity of this trait has been annulled, as it is highly 
relevant in the communicative systems of other animals (Wohlgemuth, Adam & Scharff, 2014). 
Hence, the FoxP2 would support not language but rather communication more generally 
(perhaps the faculty of language in a broad sense, as in Fitch, Hauser & Chomsky, 2005). 
Summing it, Christiansen and Chater (2008: 489) said that ‘language constitutes a “moving 
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target” both over time and across different human populations, and, hence, cannot provide a 
stable environment to which language genes could have adapted.’  
 
 
3.3  In the body 
 
LE is crucially linked to certain anatomical developments (Pavlenko, 2014, ch. 1). We know of 
an enlargement of the cranium, as well as the appearance of thoracic anatomical features that 
are unique to later hominids. The latter include the supralaryngeal tract and the lowered larynx, 
as well as vertebral-neural connections for breathing control (de Boer, 2009; Fitch, 2000; 
Levinson & Holler, 2014). These are crucial for the articulation of precise language sounds, as 
well as for singing and for running, yet some also give us a risk of choking. In this welter of 
factors, there exist three main lines of explanation about the relation between such anatomical 
changes and LE (for more detail, see de Boer, 2009, 2012; Fitch, 2000; de Boer & Fitch, 2010): 
(a) preadaptations for language (Kay et al., 1998), (b) interactive language-biology shifts 
(Corballis, 2003; Levinson & Dediu, 2009), and (c) processes independent of language 
(Chomsky, 2011).  
 
 
3.4  In culture 
 
The cultural factor is informed from language fieldwork and archaeology, each tackled below. 
 
 
3.4.1  Universals vs diversity of language 
 
On this point as in others, the schism between nativism and emergentism is such that evidence 
against one is often proof for the other. Thus came the dispute about recursion. Hailed by some 
as a design feature of the linguistic faculty (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch, 2002), when Everett 
(1986; 2007) reported it as absent from the Pirahã language, any alleged universality of this 
language feature started to be questioned. In echoing this from a cognitive standpoint, 
Tomasello (2008) enumerated some recursive, common human activities. Yet, a broader sort of 
universals is also possible: functionalist universals are construed as ‘both unique to the human 
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mind and sufficient for language, yet not specifically evolved for language’ (Enfield, 2013: 
158), unlike the specificity of formal universals (Greenberg, 1963).  
 
Proposals about an innate language faculty have come with design constraints (Jackendoff & 
Pinker, 2005)—when not categorical principles (Greenberg, 1963). It would follow, then, that 
every language should share significant properties. It was that very connection that led to a long 
quest for linguistic universals, now via fieldwork on isolated languages, now via language 
acquisition studies (for a comprehensive discussion, see Evans and Levinson, 2009, and 
commentary therein). Among other findings, ‘constituency’—[[which] [allows] [for [[the 
[connection] [of [structures]]]]] [in [a systematic [guise]]]]—is present in an overwhelming 
majority of the known languages (Evans & Levinson, 2009). On the other hand, more recently, 
the rarer indigenous languages—mostly in Oceania and South America—have become the 
strongest case against universals. Below, Greenbergian, formal universals are listed which have 
been refuted to date (adapted from Evans & Levinson, 2009).5 
 
—  Phonetics: The possibility of sounds in a language is virtually infinite, for all we know.  
—  Phonology: Pattern CV > V > VC is not universal. 
—  Morphology: Isolating languages are no less functional than polysynthetic ones. 
—  Lexicon: The Big Four (nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs) are not all universal. 
—  Syntax: Subject and Object categories are not universal; nor is recursion. 
—  Semantics: Space, quantity, colour, etc. are not universally articulated as in English.  
—  Discursive: Conditionals are not always expressed via isolated morphemes. 
  
 
3.4.2  Culture as a gateway to language 
 
The evolution of cultural practices has been explored via comparative studies with 
chimpanzees, on the one hand, and via archaeological explorations of early cultural products 
(Davidson, 2003). In the comparative tradition, Tennie, Call and Tomasello (2009) investigated 
the interaction between process-oriented social learning, and increasing group cooperation, 
finally coining the ‘ratchet’ effect—i.e., accumulation of cultural practices (cf. the social 
cognition factor, in section 3.1.2; see also Tomasello, 2014; van Leeuwen, Cronin, & Haun, 
                                                          
5The map of diversity resulting from such fieldwork has invited revision of the traditional ‘shoehorning’ custom, 
by which any so-called ‘exotic’ language would be subsumed onto Latin grammatical principles (Tomasello, 2008; 
Haspelmath, 2010). 
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2014; Dean, Vale, Laland, Flynn, & Kendal, 2014). In the case of archaeological explorations, 
two main types can be distinguished: semiotic references, as painted on vases or walls (Chazan 
& Horwitz, 2009), and tools, furniture and shelter (Stout, Toth, Schick, & Chaminade, 2008). 
Based on these cultural products, scholars ellucidate what mental mechanisms must have been 
necessary for their production (Pavlenko, 2014, Ch. 1). In the same vein, Uomini and Meyer 
(2013) investigated the relationship between the neural demand for language use and that for a 
prehistoric practice like stone knapping, finding a correlation between the two. The cultural 
factor, as studied in the empiricist paradigm, is considered subsequent to the cognition factor, 
and parallel to the biological factor (Tomasello, 2008; Enfield, 2013). That is, evolution of 
(social) cognitive skills would have set the mind ready for increasing linguistic elaboration, 
which in turn would have allowed the other two factors to co-shape protolanguage, then 
languages. Focused on earliest stage, Steels (2012) modelled the emergence of mirror behaviour 
and its role for body language. Modelling also serves to trace the often obscure course of 
grammaticalization. Interestingly, while this used to be modelled backwards, starting with the 
resulting form, to then tackle the proto-form—e.g., ‘give’ deriving from ‘other-have’—, recent 
computational techniques have allowed for simulations in the natural direction, starting with 
the proto-form, through the gradual addition of conventionalized patterns (Vogt, 2006b). In all, 
modelling is a method on the rise in LE research. Furthermore, it is linked to less speculation, 
as Table 2 shows. 
 
language evolution modelling speculation (3)  
÷ language evolution modelling (2,026)  
= 0.001481 
 
Table 2. Ratio of speculation for LE with modelling (cf. Table 1; calculated as there).  
 
Modelling is a viable method, so long as we acknowledge its limitations (Hurford, 2003; 
Perfors, 2014). For instance, it may be necessary to post-test these models in behavioural 
experiments (e.g., Vogt & Mastin, 2013; see also greater possibilities of modelling in Franks, 
Griffiths, & Jhumka, 2013). Aside from computational simulations, there is another type of 
simulation in LE, of a behavioural nature, conducted with human participants. For instance, this 
is useful in experimental semiotics—the study of novel communicative forms—, enabling the 
reproduction of behaviour such as compositionality (Galantucci and Garrod, 2011). 
Behavioural simulation generally offers less control but greater ecological validity. 
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Taken in toto, the LE literature reveals that language is fundamentally linked to various systems 
in mind, body and culture. In this, traditional methods coexist with the latest computational 
tricks which are applied to the modelling of varied LE phenomena. Yet beyond that, there is 
the causality of such evolvements: how fundamental is each? This has preoccupied several 
colleagues, of late (Wu, 2014; Hauser et al., 2014). And it is a circular question: we would need 
more fundamental data on LE to commonly settle for one definition of language, and we would 
also need a definition of language to know what to focus on, and what to place second, within 
the mass of data. This brings us to a possibly relevant prescription: different reviews. As it 
seems, extant reviews are most commonly centred (particular) theories (e.g., Christiansen & 
Kirby, 2003), or on (particular) methods (e.g., Vogt, 2009). Far from denying the great service 
of such reviews, we find that such as massive topic as this, in terms of inherent perspectives 
and hence of research production too, does necessitate a different approach to its reviews. 
Indeed the new kind of review would be more directly centred on the questions themselves 
which drive our enquiry, e.g. what are the underpinnings of language at different levels. One 
could argue that this is already done in effect, but what we propose is actually scaffolding the 
review up to these questions, right from the headings in the article. This would imply in turn 
that the author of such a kind of review would aim for objectivity from the first letter, not 
foregrounding their own work but rather trying to capture as much as possible of the relevant, 
general buzz. 
 
The last major conclusion from this review is the increasing importance of non-classic 
perspectives. To be sure, this connects to the speculation we analysed above, facing us with the 
elephant in the room. There is a trade-off in today’s science between the need to honour the 
facts and only the facts, and, on the other pole, the drive to explore new avenues. In LE research, 
there will always be the alibi that we lack data, and need extra digging for it. Exemplifying the 
extra digging, some of the current new perspectives are centred on extra-cognitive biological 
evolvements (Munro & Verhaegen, 2011); others on extra-linguistic cognition (Stout, Toth, 
Schick, & Chaminade, 2008); others on language-internal factors (Heine & Kuteva, 2007; 
Progovac, 2015), and yet others on the junction of general cognition and language (Steels, 






4  Role of embodied cognition in LE 
 
In the wake of new advances in linguistics and the cognitive sciences, LE researchers start to 
embrace the state-of-the-art, and integrate it with older schemas—however tentatively at first. 
Since the time of Structuralism, through the cognitive revolution of the late 20th century, up 
until the early 2000s, research on the ability for language had been dominated by a linguocentric 
perspective. The speaker, if acknowledged at all, would be ancillary to the system (e.g., 
Chomsky, 1968; for a review, see Levelt, 2013). Language would be honoured an exclusive 
region in the brain, with no fundamental interaction onto other networks (Fodor, 1983). Only 
recently, with the advent of a functionalist view of language 
(Darnell, Moravcsik, Noonan, Newmeyer, & Wheatley, 1999), the celebration of cross-
linguistic diversity (Evans, & Levinson, 2009), and the expansion of brain imaging (Carreiras, 
& Clifton, 2004), the spotlight has moved onto the speakers and their environments. Now, non-
verbal communication is acknowledged as an essential component of language (Macedonia, 
2014; Willems, Özyurek, & Hagoort, 2007), with some evidence suggesting that gestures 
precede verbal language in ontogeny and phylogeny (Tomasello, 2003, 2008). Relatedly, 
Bouchard (2013) argued for the human ability to image concepts offline—without direct 
perception—as a driver of language (see also Adornetti & Ferretti, 2015). Only on that soil, the 
author argues, did symbol recursion and grammar arise. Such findings have contributed to the 
study of language as ‘embodied,’ or embedded in ecologies both internal and external to the 
speaker (Shapiro, 2014). Further, it has recently been argued that embodiment may have been 
crucial for the emergence of private and social semiotic structuration, and hence of language 
(Stutz, 2014; for a related take on music, see Perlovsky, 2015). In toto, much in the same way 
as functionalism had shown that the ‘visible language’—the system—is not all there is to 
language, embodiment theory has shown that neuronal connections are not all there is to 
cognition.6 It is in the context of such linguistic and cognitive paradigm shifts that we approach 
language evolution hereby—namely through an experiment designed to simulate the influence 
of human embodied cognition on the evolution of language.  
 
Has embodiment affected the evolution of language and languages, much as it now affects 
language use? Logical though it may seem, this study is actually a first, to our knowledge. There 
                                                          
6Notions comparable to ‘embodiment’ include ‘situated’ and ‘grounded’ cognition (see Shapiro, 2014). Also 
note that embodiment could as well be fundamentally distinguished from functionalism, in that the former is an 
advancement ahead of the latter in chronological, and perhaps scientific, terms.  
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has been some research on when, why and how embodied thinking takes place, for instance, as 
reflected in the use of gestures (Pouw, De Nooijer, Van Gog, Zwaan and Paas, 2014). But there 
is little if any data on how embodied cognition may have influenced the development of forms 
of cognition such as language. As a gateway into this puzzle, we will analyze the emergence of 
word order preferences in two different conditions. 
 
Research on word order has mostly centered on the sequencing of verb, subject and object in 
transitive clauses across languages. As an illustration of word orders, an event such as a pirate 
throwing a guitar is recounted differently across languages: where Dutch speakers say ‘the 
pirate’ (subject, S) ‘threw’ (verb, V), ‘the guitar’ (object, O) (Dutch=SVO language), Turkish 
speakers say ‘the pirate the guitar threw’ (Turkish=SOV language).7 Related research off the 
language-typological scope has focused on word order preferences.8 For instance, Schouwstra 
and de Swart (2011; henceforth, SdS) conducted a non-linguistic experiment wherein Turkish 
and Dutch participants gestured to represent drawings of simple events. Crucially, some were 
extensional events—i.e., with a tangent action and object, like throw a guitar—, while others 
were intensional events—i.e., with a more imaginary quality, like think of a guitar. On their 
non-linguistic representations, Turkish and Dutch participants alike tended to represent 
extensional events as SOV, and intensional events as SVO.  
 
To test our critical question on the role of embodied cognition in LE, we replicated SdS’s 
manipulation of event types, and crucially added an extra variable: bodily versus symbolic 
communication. Indeed, on one task, participants represented the pictures by gesturing, as they 
did in SdS (embodied task); yet on the other task, participants conveyed the pictures by way of 
written codes (disembodied task). The aim of the gesturing task was to instill in the participants 
a sense of bodily involvement and perceptual iconicity, thus tapping into the modal cognitive 
system, whereas the coding task, in contrast, is more deprived of perception and thus should 
engage the more abstract mental systems (cf. Paivio’s 1971 dual code). Our hypothesis on the 
critical role of embodied cognition in LE would be tentatively confirmed so long as the 
cognitive system manipulation overrode the event type manipulation. 
 
                                                          
7If less common, other languages have other patterns, such as VSO and VOS (Dryer, 2011). 
8In fact, ‘word’ in ‘word order preference’ is a proxy for entity, or semantic role, aside from language typological 
distinctions. After all, one general conclusion from Schouwstra and de Swart is that the SOV/SVO typological 
contrast may be explained by cognitive constraints of meaning. 
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4.1  Method  
 
4.1.1  Participants 
 
Eight Tilburg University students, two males and six females, participated for no reward. Their 
native languages were Dutch (5), Chinese (1), Portuguese (1), and Serbian (1), all SVO in 
nature—regardless, as SdS showed, the native language is not crucial in this question. 
 
 
4.1.2  Materials 
 
The set of stimuli, borrowed from SdS, consisted of 20 pictures of extensional events, and 
another 20 of intensional events, each event characterized by three crucial semantic roles: 
action, agent, and patient. 
 
                                              
                                                             
 
       Figure 1. Stimuli taken from SdS. Extensional events are above; intensional below. 
 
In the disembodied condition, participants were provided with a pool of symbols of three 
categories--numbers, letters and shapes--, along with a board with empty slots on which they 
would have to code the events, i.e., as summarized in three key constituents of their choice. 
 
         
Figure 2. Symbol pool, left, empty symbol boxes, right, and an example of the boxes filled. 
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4.1.3  Design 
 
Along with the contrast of embodied/disembodied tasks, we distinguished between extensional 
and intensional actions, both variables being distributed within one single group (Table 3). All 
participants saw all items, but two different versions of the design were distributed 50:50, with 
the cognitive system tasks in opposite orders, in order to control for any primacy effect in favour 
of either cognitive system. In other words, for the embodied-first group, the gesturing task was 












Table 4. Two-by-two design of the experiment. 
  
 
4.1.4  Procedure 
 
The instructions were identical across the counterbalanced groups. In the gesturing task, the 
procedure was followed as in SdS, whereby participants were shown pictures which they had 
to represent through iconic gestures (pantomiming). Figure 3 illustrates it.  
 
                   
 
Figure 3. A participant in the embodied condition represents the event on the left, intensional, 
which results in an SVO order, in accord with SdS’s results. 
 
Their gestures were recorded, and supposedly (only to render a communicative feeling to the 
task) this was ‘to be broadcast to a remote partner with no access to the pictures, who should 
be able to understand the events on the basis of the participants’ gestures.’ Participants were 
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not permitted to use speech, but could produce upper and lower body movements, as well as 
nonverbal sounds, without any constraints, stopping at any time they thought the meaning had 
been fully conveyed. Note, however, that some participants were advised to focus on three key 
parts to each event, whereas others were not (see Criticism below). The coding task was 
equipped with a symbol pool with three different categories, namely letters, numbers, and 
geometric shapes. Participants were first trained in matching the symbols provided onto the 
semantic roles of the event on screen. Four examples were provided with no conventional 
alphabetic or ordinal sequencing that might be used to bypass a new structuration of events. 
The experimenters did warn the participant in case the representation lacked clarity. After the 
training, the experimental trials ensued. Here, the experiment unfolded similarly to the set-up 
in SdS, and no significant feedback was provided.  
 
 
4.2  Results 
 
In our design, we had 176 total, trials, made up of 128 experimental trials and 48 training trials. 
The results of this first exploratory experiment were not quite as expected, with a 45% of invalid 
trials; accordingly, it was decided to include the training trials, too, in the final analysis, which 
conveniently increased the valid data. We considered valid trials only those with preferences 
SOV or SVO, in line with the findings of our basis study, SdS. Trials declared invalid included 
patterns such as OVS, OSV, and VOS, as well as trials missing one of the crucial event 
components, e.g., SSV, VV, VO… One further remark on our method is in order: sometimes 
participants would refer to the same item (S, V or O) over again at different points; in such 
cases, only the first three different constituents were taken into consideration. Table 4 provides 
the results. 
 
  176 total trials 
Cognitive System Event type SOV SVO Ratio Other 
Embodied 
(Gestures) 
Extensional 13 15 1.15 
79 
Intensional 9 13 1.44 
Disembodied 
(Symbols) 
Extensional 5 23 4.60 
Intensional 3 16 5.33 
 
Table 4. Results. The ‘ratio’ is the result of dividing SVO by SOV. 
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We had wondered whether, in the symbolic task, we would find some systematic assignment 
of symbols to event roles. There was no such consistency in the data of any participant. Aside 
from that, there is an apparent consistency of word order preferences through both of our 
variables. Indeed, SVO is always more common than SOV, in both cognitive system conditions, 
and in both event type conditions. Yet it is cognitive systems that seem to drive our figures, as 
numbers vary dramatically and consistently between the embodied condition and the 
disembodied one. In comparison, the event type distinction fares more weakly, with very slight 
differences between extensional and intensional events. A comparison of variances could 
further help us decide on this, and so we have calculated ratios that limit the SVO/SVO contrast 
to one number per condition. If we compare the ratios for each cognitive system, we get 2.6 
versus 9.9, namely a difference of 7.3. For the event type ratios across cognitive systems, we 
get 5.8 and 6.8, hence a difference of 1 point. Thus, it is clear that the effect of the cognitive 
system manipulation is larger than the event type manipulation, and this tentatively confirms 
the hypothesis that embodied cognition would have played a critical role in LE.  
 
The findings reported in SdS – the correlation of extensional events with SOV patterns, and 
intensional events with SVO – is not altogether mirrored by our results, yet we cannot conclude 
a total refutation either. Firstly, part of our results are in fact at one with the said correlations, 
as is the case of intensional events in each of the communicative conditions. Secondly, the fact 
that we cannot apply statistics with such a small sample stops us from testing the significance 
of the event type variable. 
 
Our results are in opposition with a bulk of evidence for the predominance of SOV across the 
World’s languages (Gell-Mann & Ruhler, 2011). Likewise, it counters the cognitive 
‘naturalness’ hypothesis about that order preference (Goldin-Meadow, So, Özyurek, & 
Mylander, 2008). What we found was a sheer prevalence of the SVO pattern, with 67 trials 
presenting SVO, dwarfing the 30 trials with SOV. In this, to the extent that our event type 
contrast may have overridden the alleged SOV prevalence, our results would concur with SdS.  
 
Criticism. From this coarse approach, it permeates that embodied cognition might actually have 
played a major role in the evolution of word order preferences, and so perhaps on other common 
semantic phenomena. However, our experimental set-up was not perfectly rigorous, and our 
results are not clearly contestable for one particular hypothesis. There were flaws in our 
experimental design, as well as minor conducting mistakes. To start with the former, we had 
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distinguished a perceptual iconicity task based on pantomiming, and an abstract, symbolic task 
based on coding. The latter has sometimes failed, however, with participants drawing relations 
between the symbols and the referents that were not purely arbitrary but, in fact, rooted in the 
real world, as heard in the verbal descriptions posterior to the written coding of the disembodied 
condition. Script-based examples included: ‘A for witch-made Art,’ ‘B for Beautiful princess,’ 
‘C for Creepy witch,’ ‘D for Delicious stew,’ and ‘A for Anastasia, the princess,’ so christened 
by one participant. Other perceptual relations for coding the scenes included 3, for a bent 
moustache, and  for a table. Far from our expectations, too, participants matched some of the 
symbols to ‘adjuncts’ such as locatives, instruments and end states. Such unexpected behaviour 
betrays our major flaw: loose ends in the instructions.  
 
Because participants did not know just what to make of the written instructions on screen, we 
could but support them verbally off the record—and that is where an experiment will go off 
science. Problematically, the experimenter’s knowledge about the experimental design—with 
its target and filler components—is likely to go off into such clarifications, in which target 
components may predominate, potentially biasing the responses thereafter. This could have 
happened with some of our participants whom we helped by highlighting the target components 
in the stimulus, namely, agent, action and patient. The same applied to the actual word orders, 
though we did care not to pronounce any of our target orders, SVO, SOV. In this kind of 
experiments, and in most for that matter, instructions are to be engraved a priori, and not 
amended in any way. Our participants should all have been commended to describe the pictures 
in full, highlighting ‘in full.’ Thus, representations would have lasted relatively longer, with 
participants going through many a filler, with no indication to the contrary. As in SdS, this 
would have ensured that the target components of pictures were noticed and expressed naturally 
and completely, thus decreasing incomplete trials (e.g. VV, SVV, VO…).  
                      
Feedback on training trials is to be avoided. It is best to have fixed, clear instructions (previously 
tested in a pilot), and do away with any interaction on-the-fly between the conductor and the 
participant. We also had smaller procedural mistakes. One of these regarded the interface: in 
the disembodied condition, our participants had to shift between a computer screen and a sheet, 
on which they coded the elements of the scene on the PC. This is to be avoided, as we have 
checked it led one participant to confusion, and that in turn led to the very bad off-the-record 
interaction. There is yet one more general remark in order concerning our theoretical 
background. The two studies anchoring this experiment—on the one hand Stutz’s hypothesis 
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on embodiment and language evolution, and, on the other, SdS’s look at extensional and 
intensional events in the preference for SOV and SVO word orders—are both fairly recent, and 
neither appears to have been further addressed (i.e., there are no citations of either article to 
date). This circumstance made this experiment very exciting to us, but at the same time it did 
pose a major challenge.  
 
 
5  Summary and discussion 
 
Inquiry into the origins of language—a major part of the current LE inquiry—was muted for 
one century due to an overflow of speculative theories. Years after the start of the ban, in the 
mid-19th century, linguist William D. Whitney (1873: 279) labelled the topic as ‘mere windy 
talk.’ Nearly 150 years later, Richardson (2007: 144) opined that ‘an answer advanced in the 
absence of knowledge of the details is a hypothesis without foundation. It is but speculation.’ 
Along with a renewed scientific drive, the post-ban inquiry into LE presents influence of 
Darwin (1859), as evident in the widespread construal of continuism—i.e., gradual, 
phylogenetic evolution from our ancestors’ communicative practices (Pinker, 2003; Tomasello, 
2008; but see Chomsky, 2011).  
 
At present, the LE inquiry is a complex pursuit formed by (1) multiple subtopics—origins, 
change and acquisition—, (2) multiple questions—what evolved, how, why, where and when—
, (3) multiple disciplines—linguistics, anthropology, psychology, genetics, neurology and 
archaeology, and multiple methods, and (4) multiple methods—theoretical, comparative and 
simulative. Currently, most research probes into the systems underpinning language, which 
appear at numerous levels: mental, genetic, anatomical and cultural. Which system is 
fundamental for language is one key question. The other major question is, why did such 
systems come to be: for language, because of it, or independently? LE has a vivid production, 
evident in its breadth of perspectives. First, fieldwork has seen a myriad languages catalogued 
the World over. Psychology and cognitive science have been equally prominent perspectives; 
whilst Chomsky (1968) pioneered on these, the definitive cognitive turn was marked by Pinker 
and Bloom (1990). Archaeology is another discipline of major relevance; even though rarely 
carried out directly for LE, it is key in dating and locating the start of language (Perreault, 
Mathew, & Petraglia, 2012). In fact, much of this draws on theoretical and experimental 
analyses that do not address LE directly (see overviews, e.g., Tallerman & Gibson, 2012).  
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On most fronts, this inquiry appears divided over the nativist-empiricist dichotomy. While 
earlier times were dominated by nativist, UG-aligned views such as Pinker and Jackendoff’s 
(2005), the past two decades have seen a surge of publications on language acquisition (Pye, 
Pfeiler, de León, Brown, & Mateo, 2007) and on linguistic diversity (Evans and Levinson, 
2009). In spite of the recent ‘pendulum swing’ (Enfield, 2013: 155) the inquiry is taking long 
to reach quorum over its central dilemmas. Surely this is caused in part by the schism over 
nativism and emergentism. It is such a crucial question, and yet it is rather circular, too. Some 
researchers long to leave the dispute behind; but how? As we try, it may be fitting to rethink 
over our reviews. The multiplicity of factors and approaches that characterizes LE calls for an 
all-encompassing approach on reviewing work. Thus, aside from the more traditional reviews 
centred on methods and theories, a new kind of overview, broader in scope, may help to keep 
the field up to its fast research production. In addition, we find reason to give new methods a 
chance. Promising new methods include ‘neuroarchaeology’ (Uomini & Meyer, 2013), where 
stone knapping (more relevant than it would seem!) is analysed for its cognitive demands, as 
well as the better-known computational modelling. The latter have enabled us to control known 
factors, and test potential ones. In the midst of a possible deadlock blocking the ultimate 
questions of LE, modelling can help to connect similar views across disciplines, as well as 
compare different or opposite views. For instance, in a recent statistical approach to animal 
communication systems, Kershenbaum et al. (2014) refuted the traditional idea that animals 
communicate in predictable sequences. Novel and eclectic perspectives may well bring the right 
new explanations.  
 
The speaker appears to be as important to language and its evolution as body and environment 
are important to cognition. There is already considerable evidence on those premises, so in our 
embodiment study we wanted to go further. Putting those two premises in interaction, we have 
tested whether bodily-situated cognition should have influenced the evolution of language. We 
adapted a previous experiment on word order preferences by adding a new distinction: 
embodied and disembodied tasks. Our results tentatively confirm the hypothesis, as 
manipulation of bodily involvement in the experimental tasks (gestures/codes) influenced the 
semantic preferences of participants (SOV/SVO) more systematically than previously-reported 
semantic biases (extensional/intensional events). This exploratory approach demonstrates its 
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